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Abstract
To unveil the strategic interaction between the government and the labour union in a
unionised economy, a policy-game model is estimated by cointegrated Vector Autoregres-
sive system using Italian quarterly data (1960-2009) on government budget surplus (fiscal
efforts), hours not worked (strikes), unemployment and real wages. The long-run coin-
tegration relationships are interpreted as the players’ reaction functions and the long-run
equilibrium as the equilibrium of the game. The identification of the long-run cointegration
relationships allows indeed to determine if efforts and strikes are strategic complements or
strategic substitutes. Finally, speed of long-run adjustment provides insights about the ef-
fectiveness of government and labour union strategies.
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1 Introduction
In several OECD countries, especially in continental Europe, unions can influence the effects and
the transmission mechanism of fiscal policies. Fiscal policies aim at mitigating unemployment,
stimulating the economy and stabilising business cycles. The overall public budget (government
budget surplus) denotes the fiscal efforts required to achieve government targets and maintain
fiscal sustainability.1
Recently, Franzosi (2006) has argued that a government’s partisanship and fiscal policy affect
union behaviour and strikes: it takes two to tango. Governments use fiscal policies to gain the
support of their electorate while unions use strikes to maximise support from workers. However,
the government can not arbitrarily use fiscal policy to minimise unemployment (Kiander et al.
2004, Dome´nech & Garc´ıa 2008) and maximise its support from the electorate and strikes are
costly, therefore the strategic interaction between the government and the labour union is crucial
to the effectiveness of fiscal efforts and strikes.2
The Italian economy is an ideal setting for investigating the economic and political inter-
action between governments and unions. Issues involving the interactions of fiscal policy and
strikes are emblematic of Italian history and the post World War II configuration of Italian
institutions. In Italy, the importance of labour unions both in industrial relationships and in
economic and social policy issues is a well-known historical fact. Despite a decline in union
density and the technological changes occurring in recent years, labour unions continue to play
an important role in the performance of the labour market.3 In addition, since labour market
institutions have not changed during recent years, labour unions can still affect the political and
social climate.4 Italian industrial relationships have been marked by important political partici-
1Mierau et al. (2007), using a panel discrete choice model for 20 OECD countries for the period 1970-2003,
found that fiscal adjustments are affected by economic and political variables (such as upcoming elections or broad
policy reform). For advanced countries, Lavigne (2011) found that fiscal rules contribute to avoiding situations
of fiscal distress. Heylen et al. (2013) found new evidence on the role of public sector efficiency for the success of
fiscal consolidation.
2To capture the restrictiveness or expansiveness of fiscal policy, Schneider & Zapal (2006) apply the growth
accounting technique proposed by Von Hagen et al. (2002) and used by Hughes Hallett et al. (2003). They define
net fiscal efforts as the part of the change in the budget not due to growth of the economy, a change in monetary
policy conditions, or a change in the level of public debt.
3In the post-war period, the evolution of the Italian union density of employed workers displays a long cycle
of about 30 years, with two peaks (about 50%), one in 1950 and one in 1976. In 1960 and in 2009, the Italian
union density was about 25% and 34%, respectively. For more details, see Checchi & Corneo (2000) and Franzosi
(2006).
4The most important pro-labour legislative act, in Italy, was the Workers’ charter of rights, enacted in 1970.
The Italian constitutional law has increased work council powers and protects union activity. Notably, labour
courts have extended the national wages agreement with unions, to cover all workers. Recently, the Workers’
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pation of the three biggest labour union confederations (CGIL, CISL and UIL) that cover almost
all employees. Despite their ideological divisions, when the labour unions negotiated economic
and social policy issues with the governments, their differences were vague and confederations
often cooperated with each other. Italian labour unions and Leftist parties have historical sim-
ilar political positions as both pursue the interests of workers. However, while labour unions
have fought for higher wages, political parties have mainly sought to reduce unemployment rate.
In this paper, we explain how a government, mainly concerned with unemployment, and a
labour union, mainly concerned with wages, may jointly determine the optimal level of their
control variables: fiscal efforts and strikes. We start our analysis with a model in which we posit
some restrictions to tackle parameter identification. By using Italian quarterly data (1960-2009)
on government budget surplus (fiscal efforts), hours not worked (strikes), unemployment and
real wages, we estimate a cointegrated Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model (Johansen 1995,
Juselius 2006). In this framework, we interpret the long-term economic relationships as the
players’ reaction functions and the long-run equilibrium as the equilibrium of the game between
the government and the labour union. The estimated model shows that fiscal efforts and strikes
are indeed jointly determined and whether they are strategic substitutes or complements, in
the long-run.5 Finally, we analyse the structure of adjustment towards equilibrium, using the
concept of ‘speed of long-run adjustment’ introduced in Fanelli & Paruolo (2010), to discern
which player is more effective to reach its goal in the long-run equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the
relevant literature and emphasise our contribution. In Section 3, we introduce the model to
identify the players’ reaction functions. In Section 3.1, we use the vector error correction
(VEC) methodology to empirically investigate the interaction between government and union.
In Section 4, we propose an economic interpretation of our policy-game model and discuss its
main implications. Section 5 concludes the paper.
charter of rights has been repeatedly reformed reducing the legal protection of workers.
5Following Bulow et al. (1985), players choices are called strategic complements if they mutually reinforce
one another, and they are called strategic substitutes if they mutually offset one another. Games with strategic
heterogeneity allow for both strategic substitutes and strategic complements (Monaco & Sabarwal 2015).
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2 Contribution to the literature
The economic and political interaction of the strategies adopted by governments and unions is
particularly important in understanding the economic and political performance of unionised
economies, where a government’s partisanship and fiscal policy greatly affect union behaviour
and strikes. However, the interaction between fiscal policy and strikes is still a puzzle. With the
notable exceptions of Ardagna (2007) and Gylfason & Lindbeck (1986), most of the theoretical
contributions analyse the impact of fiscal policy shocks in macroeconomic models with perfectly
competitive labour markets and without considering strategic relationships between agents.
However, both Ardagna (2007) and Gylfason & Lindbeck (1986) do not consider strikes and do
not estimate the strategic interaction between governments and unions.
Few studies do attempt to explain the puzzle of strikes through the lens of macroeconomic
policy-game models where labour unions are powerful players. These macroeconomic policy-
game models are typically partial equilibrium models based on a sequential set of players’
decisions, in which the union moves first and sets wages unilaterally, then the government
selects public expenditure and, finally, firms make their hiring decisions (Azam & Salmon 2004,
Vernby 2007). Within this framework, workers may try to influence government policy through
strikes. For instance, Azam & Salmon (2004) apply an imperfect information framework in a
policy-game between union and government where the government cannot credibly commit to a
given level of employment-generating public expenditure and the union may use strikes to force
the government to increase the same public expenditures. Following a similar approach, Vernby
(2007) develops a policy-game where a union has the power to call strikes in order to entice the
government to increase its job creation efforts. Contrary to Azam & Salmon (2004), he focuses
on how the incentive for the government to pursue an accommodationist policy depends on the
type of electoral system. The studies of Azam & Salmon (2004) and Vernby (2007), nevertheless,
lack a symmetric game structure and no strategic interaction is explicitly considered in their
econometric strategy.
Exploiting the definition of effort by Schneider & Zapal (2006), our study contributes to
the existing literature in several respects. First, using Italian quarterly data and the error-
correction time series methodology, we estimate two long-run relationships between efforts,
strikes, unemployment and real wages. In particular, the estimated model shows that fiscal
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efforts and strikes are jointly determined in the long-run and that efforts and strikes are strategic
substitutes. Second, by combining our policy-game model with estimates of speed of long-run
adjustment, we find the labour union as the more effective player. Third, to interpret those
long-run relationships in a economic framework, we identify the ‘deep’ parameters of a game
model that analyses the simultaneous strategic interaction between the government and the
labour union.
3 Empirical analysis
In this section, we draw on Gylfason & Lindbeck’s (1986) game, in which government spending
is determined within a macroeconomic framework involving endogenous utility-maximising gov-
ernment and labour union. Exploiting Franzosi’s (2006) idea that a government’s fiscal policy
affect union behaviour and strikes, we propose a simultaneous policy-game in which the control
variables of the government, g, and the labour union, l, are effort and strike. The stylized
macroeconomic framework in which g and l play is also described by real wages, wage, and
unemployment, un. We posit the policy-game equilibrium and the players’ reaction functions
are valid in the long-run. To estimate the long-run equilibrium and the long-run relationships,
we identify the government’s and the labour union’s reaction function, effortR and strikeR,
as a system of simultaneous cointegrated equations and specify effortR and strikeR assuming
that the government is directly affected by unemployment (Persson & Tabellini 2000), and the
labour union by real wages (Booth 1995). Given these exclusion restrictions, the interaction
between the government and the labour union is captured by the system:
effortR + β0g + β
u
g un+ β
s
gstrike = 0 (1)
strikeR + β0l + β
w
l wage+ β
e
l effort = 0 (2)
where βji represents the coefficient in the reaction function of the player i = g, l, for the variable
j = e, s, u, w (effort, strike, un, wage), and β0i is the intercept of the player i’s reaction function.
6
In Subsection 3.1, we will focus on the case of Italy and test the hypothesis that the govern-
6The long-run equilibrium and the reaction functions (1) and (2) can be obtained as solution of a simple model
of interaction between the government and the labour union, as done in Section 4. The reaction functions of our
policy-game model have ‘deep’ parameters in line with the estimated parameters of functions (1) and (2).
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ment’s and the labour union’s reaction functions have negative or positive slopes (βsg and β
e
l ),
so that efforts and strikes are strategic substitutes or complements.
Assuming an interior solution exists, the equilibrium of the game is obtained from Eq. (1)
and Eq. (2), i.e.
effort∗ =
βsgβ
0
l − β0g
1− βsgβel
− β
u
g
1− βsgβel
un+
βwl β
s
g
1− βsgβel
wage (3)
strike∗ =
β0gβ
e
l − β0l
1− βsgβel
+
βug β
e
l
1− βsgβel
un− β
w
l
1− βsgβel
wage (4)
Defining effort = ln e, un = lnu, strike = ln s and wage = lnw, the ‘direct’ equilibrium
elasticity of e and s w.r.t. u and w are given by
Ee∗,u =
∂effort∗
∂un
=
−βug
1− βsgβel
(5)
Es∗,w =
∂strike∗
∂wage
=
−βwl
1− βsgβel
(6)
The ‘indirect’ equilibrium elasticity of efforts and strikes w.r.t. real wages and unemployment
are
Ee∗,w =
∂effort∗
∂wage
=
βwl β
s
g
1− βsgβel
(7)
Es∗,u =
∂strike∗
∂un
=
βug β
e
l
1− βsgβel
(8)
The aforementioned equilibrium properties will be estimated in the next subsection and the
policy-game model defined on the variables e, s, u and w will be presented in Section 4.
3.1 The case of Italy
Because of its history and institutional background, the Italian economy is well-suited to investi-
gate the economic and political interaction of the strategies adopted by governments and unions.
We base our empirical analysis on a hand-collected dataset comprising quarterly macroeconomic
time series relative to the Italian economy. The data cover the period 1960.Q1-2009.Q4.
In particular, we consider quarterly observations of government budget surplus, hours not
worked, unemployment and real wages, relative to the period 1960.Q1-2009.Q4, and proxy the
variables of the model as follows (subscript t denotes quarter): efforts are proxied by effortt =
6
ln
(
1 + StGDPt
)
, where St = −∆Bt is minus the public deficit, Bt is the nominal stock of debt
(source: Bank of Italy) and GDPt is the seasonally adjusted nominal Gross Domestic Product
(source: OECD); strikes are proxied by striket = ln
(
1 + HtPOPt
)
, where Ht is the amount
of hours not worked due to labour disputes arising from the labour contract (source: Italian
National Institute of Statistics) and POPt is the active population aged 15-64 (source: OECD);
unemployment is proxied by unt = ln
(
1 + UtLFt
)
, where Ut are the unemployed workers, LFt is
the labour force and UtLFt is the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate (source: OECD); real
wages are proxied by waget =
Wt
Pt
, where Wt is the hourly wage index of the manufacturing
sector and Pt is the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (source: Italian National Institute of
Statistics). From the definitions above, it turns out that effortt can be interpreted as a measure
of the budget surplus the government obtains, over the level of GDP, while striket is a measure
of the amount of hours not worked per capita.7 Some descriptive statistics are presented in
Table 1. The time series of main interest, effortt and striket, are plotted in Figure 1.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
effort -0.077 0.056 -0.214 0.031
strike 0.305 0.321 0.007 1.751
un 0.068 0.025 0.026 0.108
wage 0.806 0.247 0.293 1.057
Number of observations: 200
The four variables of our model are collected in the vector Xt=(effortt, striket, unt, waget)
′
and modelled as a VAR system with four lags, a constant and three deterministic seasonal dum-
mies. In principle, many episodes and institutional changes might have impacted the variables
included inXt, hence we could potentially enrich our VAR specification with a relatively large set
of intervention (impulse/step) dummies in Dt associated with several historical episodes.
8 How-
7There are various definitions and several measures of strikes. Hamann et al. (2012), following Hyman (1989)
and Walsh (1983), defined ‘general strike’ (or ‘protest strike’) as a temporary, national stoppage of work by
workers from many industries, directed against the executive or legislative arms of government, to enforce a
demand or give voice to a grievance. Using this definition, they distinguished and collected data on political and
economic strikes for 16 Western European countries between 1980 and 2006. Lindvall (2013), on the basis of
theories of organizational power resources, explains why political strikes are rare in countries with strong union
movements. According to his reckoning, between 1980 and 2008, there were only 10 political strikes in Italy.
8For instance, on March 13, 1979, Italy entered in the European Monetary System and signed an agreement
for the maintenance of a fixed exchange parity w.r.t. the ECU; on February 12, 1981, the separation of the
Treasury from the Central Bank occurred; on November 1, 1993, the Treaty on European Union came into force
in Italy, bringing to the creation of the European Central Bank and the European System of Central Banks on
the January 1,1999.
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Figure 1: effortt and striket over the period 1960.Q1-2009.Q4
ever, our preliminary analyses showed that the VAR-model results on the long-run equilibrium
we discuss below are substantially invariant to the inclusion of many intervention dummies.9
The reference VAR model is therefore given by
Xt =
4∑
i=1
AiXt−i + µ+ ΦDt + εt t = 1, ..., T (9)
where Ai is a 4×A matrix of parameters, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, µ is a 4×1 vector of constants, Dt is a 3×1
vector containing three centered deterministic seasonal dummies with associated coefficients in
the 4× 3 matrix Φ, and εt is a 4-dimensional white noise process with covariance matrix Σε.
The upper panel of Table 2 reports some residuals diagnostic tests at the system level on
the VAR in Eq. (9) estimated on the period 1960.Q1-2009.Q4 (T = 196, excluding the four
initial lags). The diagnostic checks suggest that, even though the VAR disturbances are not
Gaussian, the residuals obtained from the estimated system with four lags are consistent with
the occurrence of serially uncorrelated disturbances.
We also computed standard information criteria and some residuals diagnostic tests at the
single-equation level. Results are reported in the lower panel of Table 2, where we consider VAR
systems with 1 up to 5 lags. The first three columns of Table 2 reports the Akaike information
criterion (AIC), the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ) and the Schwartz information
criterion (SC). The last two columns sketch the Lagrange multiplier vector test for the null of
9Among the many robustness checks we performed, we took also into account the government’s ideology (left
vs. right), the electoral system (majoritarian vs. proportional system), the election date, and union membership.
Since these political variables do not result significant, the variables considered in our model represent the relevant
political-economic environment (Castan˜eda 1995). We also estimated the system with nominal wages and inflation
instead of real wages without finding significant differences for the other variables. Results are available upon
request from the authors.
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Table 2: Diagnostic tests on the estimated VAR system in Eq. (9)
Equations: effortt striket unt waget
LM-AR 1-5 test: 1.60
[0.16]
0.80
[0.55]
2.41
[0.04]
2.03
[0.08]
LM-Normality test: 17.88
[0.00]
54.44
[0.00]
8.23
[0.02]
38.86
[0.00]
lags AIC HQ SC LM-AR 1-5 LM-Normality
1 -19.7105 -19.5746 -19.3748∗ 2.58
[0.00]
137.44
[0.00]
2 -19.6634 -19.4187 -19.0591 2.37
[0.00]
130.51
[0.00]
3 -19.7177 -19.3644 -18.8449 2.12
[0.00]
122.53
[0.00]
4 -20.1487∗ -19.6866∗ -19.0073 1.27
[0.07]
118.99
[0.00]
5 -20.0790 -19.5082 -18.6691 1.44
[0.01]
93.71
[0.00]
The estimation sample is 1960.Q1-2009.Q4, including initial lags. P-values are reported in squared brackets.
UPPER PANEL: LM-AR 1-5 is a Lagrange multiplier test for the null of absence of autocorrelation up to lag order 5.
LM-Normality is a Lagrange multiplier test for the null of Gaussian distribution.
LOWER PANEL: AIC is the Akaike information criterion; HQ is the Hannan-Quinn information criterion; SC is the
Schwartz information criterion. LM-AR 1-5 is a Lagrange multiplier vector test for the null of absence of autocorrelation
in the VAR disturbances up to lag order 5. LM-Normality is a Lagrange multiplier vector test for the null of Gaussian
distribution.
uncorrelated VAR disturbances against the alternative of correlation up to 5 lags (LM-AR 1-5)
and the Lagrange multiplier vector test for the null of Gaussian disturbances (LM-Normality),
respectively.10 The Akaike and Hannan-Quinn criteria select 4 lags, while the Schwartz criterion
selects 1 lag. The LM-AR 1-5 test suggests that only in the VAR with 4 lags the disturbances
are serially uncorrelated at the 5% level of significance.
Summing up the evidence in Table 1, we conduct our empirical investigations with the VAR
above with four lags. Mild deviations from normality can not be considered a major obstacle
to the empirical investigations we conduct in this paper, see Gonzalo (1994).
3.2 Long-run equilibrium
When the VAR system (9) is driven by unit roots and the variables are cointegrated, it is useful
to consider its VEC counterpart (Johansen 1995):
∆Xt = α(β
′, µc)
 Xt−1
1
+ 3∑
j=1
Γi∆Xt−i + µu + ΦDt + εt t = 1, ..., T (10)
10See e.g. Hendry (1995) for details about the information criteria and diagnostic tests.
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where ∆Xt = Xt −Xt−1, Γj are 4× 4 matrices which depend on the original VAR parameters
and α and β are matrices of dimension 4× r of full column rank r < 4. Under a set of suitable
identifying restrictions on β of the type β = βI , the r-dimensional vector β
′
IXt−1 captures the
long-run relationships embedded in the system, while the coefficients in the matrix α capture
the short-run (next-period) adjustment of the variables in ∆Xt to the equilibrium.
Table 3: LR trace cointegration rank test
H0 : r ≤ j Trace asym. p-value iid-boot. p-value
j = 0 76.902 0.000 0.000
j = 1 43.289 0.001 0.005
j = 2 17.065 0.027 0.072
j = 3 6.507 0.011 0.030
The estimation sample is 1960.Q1-2009.Q4, including initial lags. The cointegration rank test is conducted in the context
of the VAR system in Eq. (9) considering the case of unrestricted constant µ. ‘asym. p-value’ denotes p-values computed
from the asymptotic approximation of the test and ‘iid-boot. p-value’ denotes p-values computed using the iid bootstrap
procedure discussed in Cavaliere et al. (2012).
In Table 3 we summarise the results of the LR Trace test (Johansen 1995) to determine the
cointegration rank, r. The test is carried out by considering an unrestricted specification for
the constant, and treating the system as integrated at most of order one (I(1)). In addition
to reporting the p-values associated with the sequential LR Trace test using the asymptotic
critical values, we also compute the non-parametric iid-bootstrap counterpart of the p-values,
discussed in Cavaliere et al. (2012). When the tendency to over-reject the test in finite samples
is corrected with the bootstrap, r = 2 cointegrating relationships are accepted at the 5% level
of significance. We further observe that with r = 3, it would be difficult to identify another
relationship other than the two predicted by our policy-game model. With r = 2, the quantity
β′Xt−1 in Eq. (10) is a 2-dimensional vector and the parameters in β need to be identified, i.e. β
must fulfil the restriction β = βI , where βI matches the conditions discussed in Johansen (1995).
In addition, µc = (β
0
g , β
0
l )
′ is the portion of the constant we force to enter the cointegration
relationships.
The first column of the matrix βI , βI,1, identifies the beta coefficients of the long-run
government’s reaction function, i.e. the quantity ve,t−1 = β′I,1Xt−1 + β
0
g = effortt−1 + β0g +
βug unt−1 + βsgstriket−1 captures the deviation of the observed efforts, effortt−1, from its long-
run equilibrium level, effortR, as implied by Eq. (1). The second column of the matrix
βI , βI,2, identifies the beta coefficients of the long-run labour union’s reaction function, i.e.
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vs,t−1 = β′I,2Xt−1 + β
0
l = striket−1 + β
0
l + β
w
l waget−1 + β
e
l effortt−1 captures the deviation of
the observed strikes, striket−1, from its long-run equilibrium level, strikeR, as implied by Eq.
(2). Overall, the simultaneous system of cointegrated equations is given by
(β′I , µc)
 Xt−1
1
 = vt−1 (11)
where vt−1 = (ve,t−1, vs,t−1)′. This system is exactly identified, but we also consider a set of
joint restrictions on the not significant adjustment coefficients α of the control variables effortt
and striket. In particular, we found that effort is ‘weakly exogenous’ w.r.t. the identified βI
(Hendry 1995), meaning that there is no next-period adjustment of ∆effortt to the two long-run
equilibrium relationships. Thus, considering the set of restrictions on βI and α jointly, we have
2 over-identifying (testable) restrictions.
The estimated identified long-run relationships are given by
(βˆ
′
I , µˆc)
 Xt−1
1
 =
 βˆ
′
I,1Xt−1 + βˆ
0
g
βˆ
′
I,2Xt−1 + βˆ
0
l
=

effortt−1 + 0.245
(0.089)
striket−1 + 4.901
(0.937)
unt−1 − 0.493
striket−1 + 1.214
(0.652)
effortt−1 + 0.664
(0.126)
waget−1 − 0.836
(12)
and are also reported in Table 4, along with the adjustment coefficients α. The estimation of
α and βI was carried out by ML. The LR test reported in the bottom part of Table 4 can be
regarded as a statistical test for the overall specification.11
The sign of the beta coefficients of efforts and strikes in βˆI show that the government and
the labour union have strategic substitutes, meaning that a more ‘aggressive’ player decreases
the level of the variable controlled by the other player. The estimated beta coefficients allow us
to compute the game model’s elasticities derived in Eq.s (5)-(6) and summarised in Table 5. At
equilibrium, the ‘direct’ elasticities are negative and the ‘indirect’ elasticities are positive: an
11It is worth to explicit our orthogonality assumption through which other players have been marginalised out
from the model. Although the proxy we have used for strikes is a measure of ‘general strikes’, the results in Table
4 suggest that the possible effects of the strikes directed against other players are conveyed in the cointegration
residual, vˆs,t−1 = striket−1 + βˆ
0
l + βˆ
w
l waget−1 + βˆ
e
l effortt−1, which captures the transitory part of striket not
explained by our model. It follows that the long-run properties of the time series we have used for strike are well
captured by our policy-game model.
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Table 4: Estimated cointegration relationships and adjustment coefficients for fixed cointegra-
tion rank r = 2
Estimated βI
(
βˆI
µˆ′c
)
=

1 1.214
(0.652)
0.245
(0.089)
1
4.901
(0.937)
0
0 0.664
(0.126)
−0.493 −0.836

Estimated α
ve,t−1 vs,t−1
∆effortt 0 0
∆striket −0.512
(0.188)
−0.269
(0.089)
∆unt −0.009
(0.002)
−0.000
(0.001)
∆waget −0.011
(0.009)
0.020
(0.004)
LR test of restrictions χ2(2) = 1.041
[0.594]
The estimation sample is 1960.Q1-2009.Q4, including initial lags.
UPPER PANEL: estimated cointegration relationships.
LOWER PANEL: estimated adjustment coefficients. The LR test is a likelihood ratio test for the zero restrictions in the
α matrix. Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in squared brackets.
increase in the variables directly (indirectly) affecting the players reduce (expand) their optimal
strategy. Regarding the magnitude of the elasticities, we note that the labour union is more
reactive than the government (8.469 > 6.976, 0.945 > 0.232), and that changes in unemployment
have stronger effects than changes in wages (6.976 > 0.232, 8.469 > 0.945), at the long-run
equilibrium. The estimated strikes elasticities testify as the decrease in unemployment and
the increase in real wages seem to explain the historical long-run decrease in strikes in Italy.
Furthtermore, since the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact effectiveness imply
a higher government’ efforts for Italy, our model predicts that this equilibrium’s sustainability
depends on both a decrease in unemployment and an increase in real wages. With such trends
in unemployment and real wages, the predicted effect on the level of strikes is negative.
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Table 5: Nash equilibrium properties
ML estimates of the elasticities in Eq.s (5)-(6)
Eˆe∗,u =
−βˆug
1−βˆsg βˆ
e
l
= −6.976
Eˆs∗,w =
−βˆwl
1−βˆsg βˆ
e
l
= −0.945
Eˆe∗,w =
βˆ
w
l βˆ
s
g
1−βˆsgβˆ
e
l
= 0.232
Eˆs∗,u =
βˆ
u
g βˆ
e
l
1−βˆsg βˆ
e
l
= 8.469
The estimation sample is 1960.Q1-2009.Q4, including initial lags. Standard errors in parentheses.
3.3 Speed of adjustment
The parameters in the matrix α of the VEC in Eq. (10) are short-run adjustment coefficients
and capture the next-period (next-quarter in our case) responses of the variables in ∆Xt to
lagged disequilibria vt−1 (i.e. to lagged deviations of efforts and strikes from their cointegration
levels).
The estimated αs reported in the lower panel of Table 4 suggest that the government does
not adjust in the short-run to any of the identified long-run relationships, while the labour union
adjusts significantly to the error correction terms associated with the two estimated reaction
functions. More precisely, there is no error-correction mechanism at work in the ∆effortt-
equation, meaning that effortt is ‘weakly exogenous’ w.r.t. the identified βI . These results
indicate, with some qualifications, that effortt acts as a sort of stochastic (common) trend
driving the sub-system formed by effortt and striket, while the labour union acts as the ‘buffer’
in the adjustment process, in the sense that striket is the variable which corrects, quarter-
by-quarter, the path of adjustment such that deviations from the two cointegrating reaction
functions do not drift too far apart. It turns out that the labour union’s strikes policy is
influenced by the government’s efforts not only in the long-run, as suggested by Eq. (2) and its
estimated counterpart in Eq. (12), but over shorter horizons as well.
In order to fully understand the nature of the adjustment process towards equilibrium im-
plied by our estimated model, it is necessary to disentangle the concepts of ‘short-run’ and and
‘long-run’ adjustment. The short-run adjustment depends on the elements of the matrix α,
while the long-run adjustment depends on all parameters α, Γ1, Γ2 and Γ3. Following Fanelli
& Paruolo (2010), we define the speed of long-run adjustment of effortt (striket) to a unit per-
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turbation in vˆe,t−1 (vˆs,t−1), as the number of quarters employed by effortt (striket) to complete
a portion λ (0 < λ < 1) of the adjustment path towards its long-run position; the ‘long-run
position’ is the long-run impact of vˆe,t−1 (vˆs,t−1) on effortt (striket), i.e. the long-run -or total-
multiplier. Obviously, if there is no significant long-run impact of vˆe,t−1 (vˆs,t−1) on effortt
(striket), it does not make sense to measure the speed of adjustment.
Table 6: Estimated speed of long-run adjustment (quarters) with 90% confidence intervals
Speed of adjustment of effortt striket
to perturbation to βˆ
′
I,1Xt−1 + βˆ0g = vˆe,t−1 no adj. no adj.
to perturbation to βˆ
′
I,2Xt−1 + βˆ0l = vˆs,t−1 no adj. 2
(2,42)
The estimation sample is 1960.Q1-2009.Q4, including initial lags. vˆe,t−1 and vˆs,t−1 are defined in Eq. (11) of the paper. The
reported measures of speed of long-run adjustment correspond to the long-run λ-lives (obtained with λ = 0.5) introduced in
Fanelli & Paruolo (2010). 90% confidence intervals in parentheses are computed by a non-parametric bootstrap procedure
based on M=100 replications.
Table 6 shows the estimated speeds of the long-run adjustment stemming from our VEC
system, obtained with λ = 0.5 (half-life), along with 90% confidence intervals. We compute not
only the speed of long-run adjustment of effortt (striket) to a perturbation in vˆe,t−1 (vˆs,t−1),
but also speeds of ‘cross-long-run adjustment’, i.e. the speeds of long-run adjustment of effortt
(striket) to perturbations in vˆs,t−1 (vˆe,t−1). The only significant result is the speed of long-run
adjustment of striket to vˆs,t−1, which is given by 2 quarters (point estimate) and can reach up
to a maximum of 42 quarters according to the upper bound of its 90% confidence set.
This result confirms the estimated αs in Table 4. Since striket is the variable which adjusts
both in the short-run and in the long-run to the equilibrium, we can assert that the labour
union is the more effective player. Strikes policy is ‘actively’ used to reach the labour union’s
goals and the long-run equilibrium of the system. On the contrary, the government’s efforts
adjust to strikes only in the long-run.
4 Game model
In this section, we develop a policy-game model in which the long-run equilibrium and the
reaction functions (1) and (2) can be obtained as solutions of a simple model of interaction
between two players: the government and the labour union. To simplify the political issues of
the game we model the government and the labour union as unitary players, hence we do not
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discuss their politics. In particular, policy makers and union leaders implement the optimal
policy of the median voter without any agency problem between policy makers and electors,
and between union leaders and workers, respectively.12
We assume that both players’ objective functions are separable into the part involving
the government and the labour union’s interaction on efforts, strikes, unemployment and real
wages, and the part involving other players (e.g. the organisation of employers or Central
Bank) or other variables (e.g. the inflation rate or interest rate).13 Using this orthogonality
assumption, we focus on the ‘deep’ parameters of players’ objective functions and, as well as
in the estimated reaction functions, we assume that the players’ objective functions are defined
on the government’ efforts, e, the labour union’ strikes, s, unemployment, u and real wages,
w. In particular, the effect of w on the government’s objective function, G, and the effect of u
on the labour union’s objective function, L, are only indirect: G(e; s(w), u) and L(s; e(u), w).
Consistent with a wage bargaining approach, we assume that the effect of w on L is positive.
However, since strikes are costly for all agents participating in industrial relationships (Hicks
1932), w enters L also as opportunity cost of strikes.
When the government and the labour union interact, the government focuses its efforts on
maximising support from its electorate which depends on the unemployment rate, the funda-
mental variable on which society evaluates macroeconomic outcomes (Persson & Tabellini 2000).
Thus, the government’s objective function, G, depends, for any level of labour union’ strikes
and unemployment, on its efforts e. In particular, G is specified in the form
G = vu−τs−σge− e1+ηg (13)
The first part of Eq. (13) captures the positive effect (benefit) of efforts. Since the parame-
ters −τ and −σg are negative, unemployment and strikes diminish the benefit of efforts. The
parameter ηg > 0 in the second part of Eq. (13) measures the cost of efforts. Finally, v > 0
12By this assumption, we can aggregate heterogeneous individual preferences into a unique government and
union’s objective function (Booth 1984).
13In principle, the organisation of employers does affect government and labour union, but we maintain that this
effect is only marginal in the interplay between government and labour union, in line with our partial equilibrium
approach. In the 1970s and 1980s several authors investigated the interaction between monetary policy and wage
setting in terms of policy-games. Gylfason & Lindbeck (1994) analysed first the non-neutrality of money through
a policy-game between the central bank and the labour union. More recently, Acocella & Di Bartolomeo (2004)
studied non-neutrality in policy-games involving one or more trade unions.
15
is a parameter measuring the cost-benefit ratio of efforts. Observe that electors have higher
probability of being unemployed with a higher u and a higher s generates a loss to the economy,
so we assume electors perceive a lower value for government’ efforts e whenever u and s increase.
The derivative of G w.r.t. the control variable of the player g is given by
Ge = vu
−τs−σg − (1 + ηg)eηg (14)
where the term vu−τs−σg is the constant marginal benefit of e and (1 + ηg)eηg is the increasing
marginal cost of e. Note that, to capture the idea of a trade-off between costs and benefits of
the government’s efforts, Ge has an inverted-U shape, that is the government’s control variable
e has a positive and then a negative effect on G:
Ge=0 = vu
−τs−σg > 0 Ge→+∞ = −∞ < 0 (15)
In the strategic interaction between the government and the labour union, the labour union
uses strikes to maximise support from workers who are mainly influenced by real wages (Booth
1995). Therefore, for any given government efforts and wages, the labour union’s objective
function depends on strikes s. Specifically, the objective function L is specified in the form
L = rw−ρe−ηls− s1+σl + aw (16)
The first addend of Eq. (16) captures the positive effect (benefit) of strikes because they are
intended as effective ways of participation in the socio-economic political process.14 Since the
parameters −ρ and −ηl are negative, real wages and efforts decrease the benefit of strikes. The
parameter σl > 0 in the second addend of Eq. (16) measures the cost of strikes. The parameter
a in the third addend of Eq. (16) is assumed to be high enough so that the derivative of L
w.r.t. w is positive. Finally, r > 0 is a parameter measuring the cost-benefit ratio of strikes.
Starting from the idea that union leaders are motivated by personal advancement (Ross 1953)
and that their support from workers increases when the union calls strikes against undisciplined
government, we assume that the positive effect of s decreases in efforts.
14Lee & Roemer (2005) studied a policy-game model where trade unions interact with endogenously formed
partisan political parties to explain changing political preferences for and against the unionised labour market
regime.
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The derivative of L w.r.t. the control variable of the player l is given by
Ls = rw
−ρe−ηl − (1 + σl)sσl (17)
where the term rw−ρe−ηl captures the constant marginal benefit of s and (1 + σl)sσl is the
increasing marginal cost of s. By analogy with the government trade-off between costs and
benefits, Ls has an inverted-U shape, that is the labour union’s control variable s has a positive
and then a negative effect on L:
Ls=0 = rw
−ρe−ηl > 0 Ls→+∞ = −∞ < 0 (18)
Given the strategic interaction between the two players, the optimal strategies arise from
their reaction functions. The government’s reaction function is obtained by maximising its
objective function. From the First Order Condition of this problem (by imposing Ge = 0 in Eq.
(14)), we obtain the government’s reaction function that we express in natural logs:
ln eR =
1
ηg
ln
(
v
1 + ηg
)
− τ
ηg
lnu− σg
ηg
ln s (19)
Since the government exhibits strategic substitutes, a more ‘aggressive’ labour union lowers
the marginal benefit of the government’ efforts, see Eq. (13). Therefore, the government’s
reaction function has a negative slope: −σgηg < 0. Eq. (1) corresponds to Eq. (19), where
effort = ln e, un = lnu, strike = ln s, β0g =
−1
ηg
ln
(
v
1+ηg
)
, βug =
τ
ηg
> 0 and βsg =
σg
ηg
> 0.
The labour union’s reaction function is calculated by maximising its objective function. By
imposing Ls = 0 in Eq. (17) and taking natural logs, we obtain the labour union’s reaction
function:
ln sR =
1
σl
ln
(
r
1 + σl
)
− ρ
σl
lnw − ηl
σl
ln e (20)
Since the labour union exhibits strategic substitutes, a more aggressive government lowers
the marginal benefit of strikes, see Eq. (16). The labour union’s reaction function has a
negative slope: − ηlσl < 0. As above, Eq. (2) corresponds to Eq. (20), where wage = lnw,
β0l =
−1
σl
ln
(
r
1+σl
)
, βwl =
ρ
σl
> 0 and βel = − ηlσl < 0.
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By (19) and (20), we obtain the Nash equilibrium of the game:
ln e∗ =
σl
ηgσl − ηlσg
[
ln
(
v
1 + ηg
)
− τ lnu
]
+
+
−σg
ηgσl − ηlσg
[
ln
(
r
1 + σl
)
− ρ lnw
] (21)
ln s∗ =
−ηl
ηgσl − ηlσg
[
ln
(
v
1 + ηg
)
− τ lnu
]
+
+
ηg
ηgσl − ηlσg
[
ln
(
r
1 + σl
)
− ρ lnw
] (22)
which correspond to Eq.s (3) and (4).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we model the strategic interaction between governments and labour unions in
unionised economies. Our contribution focuses on strikes, government budget surplus, unem-
ployment and real wages interdependencies. It helps to explain how government’s fiscal policy
and labour unions’ strikes policy are implemented in the long-run.
Using time series methods, we show that the proposed policy-game model is based on sound
empirical support. At equilibrium, changes in unemployment have stronger effects than changes
in wages. The effect of unemployment on efforts and strikes is respectively negative and positive,
while the effect of real wages on efforts and strikes is respectively positive and negative. Since the
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact effectiveness imply a higher government’
efforts for Italy, our model predicts that this equilibrium’s sustainability depends on both a
decrease in unemployment and an increase in real wages. With such trends in unemployment
and real wages, the predicted effect on the level of strikes is negative.
This evidence suggests that in Italy the government and the labour union have been both
powerful economic players, each capable of affecting the choice of the other player. The es-
timated coefficients of the long-run players’ reaction functions show that the government and
the labour union exhibit strategic substitutes. In addition, the estimated structure of adjust-
ment to equilibrium reveals that the labour union uses strikes policy more effectively than the
government uses fiscal policy.
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